Abstract
The present study investigated how people combine covariation information and pre-existing beliefs in causal reasoning. The results were as follows: (1) Subjects did not add up these two sources of information simply, nor did they use a threshold for covariation information. They considered beliefs first, then judged whether the covariation was consistent with their pre-existing beliefs. When these two sources of information collided, they would reconsider their pre-existing beliefs. (2) The effects of beliefs were larger than those of covariation when subjects changed their judgements. These changes were larger when the candidate cause was unbelievable.
| Keywords: | causal judgment; pre-exiting beliefs; covariation |
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